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Abstract 
Empirical evidence from recent studies suggests that the price premium on energy-efficient buildings is 
potentially higher than the pure capitalisation of energy savings but the empirical evidence on the size of the 
non-savings components is scant. This study aims to fill this research gap by investigating whether the 
mandatory energy efficiency ratings for residential properties imply benefits that go beyond energy savings. 
Using a sample of several thousand apartment transactions from Helsinki, Finland, we first test if higher 
ratings were significantly associated with higher prices. In addition to a large number of property and 
neighbourhood characteristics, this dataset contains information on building-level energy usage which 
allows us to distinguish between the cost savings effect of energy consumption and the value of more 
intangible factors associated with the energy label. The hedonic model yields a statistically significant 3.3% 
price premium for apartments in the top three energy-efficiency categories and 1.5% when a set of detailed 
neighbourhood characteristics are included. When maintenance costs containing energy usage costs are 
added, a robust and significant price premium of 1.3% persists whereas no differentiation is found for the 
medium and lower rating categories. These findings may be indicative of energy-efficient buildings having 
signalling value – and therefore an additional incentive to invest in such buildings – for ‘green’ consumers. 
However, a favourable energy rating did not appear to speed up the sales process in the analysed market. 
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An emerging strand of literature into energy efficiency suggest that indirect and intangible benefits 
of energy efficiency improvements may play a previously underestimated role. For example, Gliedt 
and Hoicka (2015) find that corporate social responsibility can act as an additional driver for energy 
performance improvements in the commercial real estate market. This finding is pertinent as 
expected cost savings alone are frequently not sufficient to trigger an investment decision 
(Popescu et al., 2012). The presence of notable and well-documented financial, institutional and 
behavioral barriers to invest in energy efficiency implies that such non-savings related incentives 
may be required to close the energy efficiency gap (Jackson, 2010; Gliedt and Hoicka, 2015). 
Therefore, Identifying and quantifying multiple benefits of energy efficiency are of increasing 
relevance in energy efficiency research (Popescu et al., 2012). 
One of the key sectors in the aims to curb energy consumption is the housing sector: Buildings are 
the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the world and represent the biggest sector of 
primary energy consumption, and housing units account for a major part of these emissions and 
consumption. Hence, from a welfare economic point of view the issue of providing adequate 
incentives for building and investing in energy efficient housing is of particular importance. The aim 
of this study is to investigate whether mechanisms that are similar to the corporate social 
responsibility factor reported by Gliedt and Hoicka (2015) are present in the housing market. In 
particular, we test for the presence and value of a green signalling effect in addition to any cost 
savings. asignalling. 
Energy efficiency measures and the energy saving potential related to buildings as well as the 
valuation effects of these measures and savings have become a prominent research subject 
around the world. This strand of scientific literature includes studies on the effect of heating 
systems (Joelsson and Gustavsson, 2009) and the building envelope (Balaras et al., 2005; 
Lechtenböhmer and Schüring, 2010; Thorsnes and Bishop, 2013; Arumägi and Kalamees, 2014) 
on the energy performance and value of housing, the influence of climatic conditions on energy 
saving measures and the energy demand of buildings (Considine, 2000; Aktacir et al., 2010; 
Rahman et al., 2010; Moustris et al., 2014) as well as the decision-making process that leads to 
energy performance improvements in the real estate sector (Gliedt and Hoicka, 2015). The role of 
home efficiency rating systems in providing important information to consumers is highlighted by 
Wong-Parodi et al (2016). Transparency about the energy efficiency status of a property enables 
consumers to make an informed choice when acquiring a property.  Nevertheless, the pricing of 
energy-efficient residential buildings has been a largely understudied topic relative to its obvious 
relevance for both the general economy and sustainable development. The reasons for this lack of 
empirical evidence are not clear, but the greater fragmentation of investors and lower fraction of 
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professional or institutional investment compared to the commercial real estate market may be a 
contributing factor. Also, residential property markets are highly regulated and prone to market 
inefficiencies. Generally, the more inefficiently a market operates, the more difficult it will be to 
isolate a hedonic price signal of an individual characteristic. Moreover, green financial instruments 
are still not used widely in the residential sector, which makes capitalisation into the lump-sum 
house price the only channel for economic rewards of sustainability in many cases. As this poses a 
significant risk for any upfront investment in energy efficiency, 'green value' might not be readily 
observable in many housing markets. Kauffman and Garafola (2016) point out  that quantifying the 
savings from higher energy efficiency levels has been largely neglected by homeowners as all 
potential savings accrue only to them. This means that once the investment is made, it becomes 
akin to a sunk cost and no accurate measurements of the actual subsequent savings and beneifts 
is usually undertaken, The authors conclude that a change is unlikely to occur unless a business 
model is developed by which an external party reaps part or all of the benefits of an energy 
efficiency upgrade and the affected parties will want to know their individual shares of costs and 
benefits.    
Despite these complications, the early study of Dian and Miranowski (1989) was one of the  first to 
suggest a direct link between the level of energy efficiency and the value of a property. More 
recently, Wameling (2010) reported higher selling prices for dwellings with lower primary energy 
demand in the German housing market, and Kahn and Kok (2014) arrived at similar conclusions in 
their study of the Californian housing market. The results by Harjunen and Liski (2014), in turn, 
indicate that the heating energy costs capitalise in prices in the Helsinki single-family housing 
market in Finland. Similar observations have been reported for Asian markets as well: Zheng and 
Kahn (2008) and Zheng et al. (2012) found significant price premia for green housing in China, and 
Deng et al. (2012) observed substantial economic returns to green housing in Singapore. 
The extant literature on potential additional drivers to invest in energy efficient housing is 
particularly scarce. In related studies, Banfi et al. (2005), Burfurd et al. (2012) and Fuerst et al. 
(2015) published findings indicating that rental housing tenants are prepared to pay higher rent for 
buildings that have adopted energy-saving measures. Burfurd et al. (2012) used laboratory 
experiments to show that information on the energy efficiency of a dwelling – either mandatory or 
voluntary – improves the market efficiency and increases investment in energy efficiency in the 
housing rental market, while the lack of information can give rise to an undesirable ’lemons market’ 
outcome. Based on data for Stockholm in Sweden, Mandell and Wilhelmsson (2011) concluded 
that there is a positive willingness to pay for environmental attributes and this willingness is greater 
for those households who state that they are environmentally aware. Popescu et al. (2012), in turn, 
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report evidence suggesting that the added value due to energy performance should be taken into 
consideration when the financial analysis within the energy audit is performed. 
Given the importance of the topic and scarcity of research on it, there is a large demand for more 
research on other potential incentives for investment in energy efficient housing. This article aims 
to provide new knowledge on the issue – knowledge that also is of practical importance having 
policy implications. In particular, we aim to bring more information on the influence of energy 
ratings on the value and liquidity of housing, including new knowledge on the willingness to pay for 
being green and on signaling household’s green values to the peers. Such willingness to pay and 
signal to the peers – that corresponds closely to the corporate social responsibility effect reported 
by Gliedt and Hoicka (2015) – could act as an additional driver for investments on energy efficiency 
not only in the housing market, but in many other sectors too. In addition to investigating a different 
real estate sector, our analysis differs from that by Gliedt and Hoicka (2015) with respect to the 
research methodology. While their results are based on survey data, our empirical analysis uses 
detailed data on the actual housing transactions. 
We use a dataset for the Helsinki metropolitan area in Finland for the period 2009-2012 that 
includes the transaction price, energy rating, and a great number of other variables describing the 
quality and location for each transacted unit. The cold climate of the study area makes the case 
study interesting also because the cost savings from insulation and thus from heating energy may 
be substantial. A greater number of heating-degree days has been consistently linked to higher 
energy demand in the residential sector (e.g. Considine, 2000; Moustris et al., 2014) which in turn 
means higher potential savings potential from more energy-efficient dwellings. While these climate-
dependent factors affect primarily the passive energy efficiency of a building, in particular heat 
loss-reducing measures, there is also an array of active systems involved in the energy 
performance rating that are not likely to be subject to thermal variations to the same extent such as 
energy monitoring and automation systems or potentially also on-site renewable energy 
generation.    
In addition to giving information regarding a market with higher requirements regarding insulation, 
the dataset is valuable because it contains information on the actual maintenance costs, including 
energy consumption, and on the time on market of each unit in our sample. Hence, the data 
present us with an opportunity to examine whether the energy rating has its own independent 
impact over the maintenance cost information on housing values and liquidity. While e.g. Brounen 
and Kok (2012) showed that higher energy label induces a price premium and low-grade labels a 
price discount in the Netherlands, no study (to the best of our knowledge) has investigated whether 
the rating affects prices after the value of energy cost savings is taken into account in the 
estimated equation. That is, to our best knowledge there is no previous research giving information 
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on the independent value of the energy efficiency rating and therefore on the potential incentives to 
invest in energy efficient housing created by the kind of rating system that is mandatory within the 
European Union. 
Furthermore, while time on market was included in previous studies of energy efficiency 
capitalisation in house prices – for example by Kholodilin and Michelsen (2014), where this 
indicator is used as a control variable to adjust asking prices that are set too high by the landlord – 
there appears to be no previous evidence on the direct link between time to sale and energy 
efficiency. Faster expected selling time could act as an additional incentive to invest in green 
housing. 
Helsinki also is an interesting case market because of the detailed information on neighbourhood 
characteristics. In particular, the data enable us to account for these characteristics more carefully 
than in the previous related studies and thereby to extract the influence of energy grades more 
accurately. In addition, our analysis is based on an actual consumption-based rating unlike in 
extant studies, since the energy ratings were based on the actual observed energy consumption in 
Finland during our study period. As typically within the EU, the rating system includes seven 
categories, ‘A’ being the most energy efficient class with energy consumption of only 0-100 kwh/m2 
per year, while ‘G’ is the most energy inefficient class (more than 280 kwh/m2 per year). A potential 
complication with the consumption-based system is that the observed energy consumption is 
dependent on the size and habits of households inhabting  the building, not only on the building 
characteristics. In our study, this concern is mitigated by the fact that heating costs are averaged 
over all households in an apartment building and within-unit electricity consumption, for example 
for household appliances and electronic devices, is excluded from the energy performance rating. 
Based on our conceptual framework, we derive three hypotheses that we test empirically: 1) due to 
a ‘signalling effect’ that arises from signalling one’s green values to the peers, the higher-tier 
ratings induce a premium in house prices, whereas the below average classes do not sell at a 
discount compared with the average energy efficiency dwellings, 2) the high-tier energy ratings 
affect the housing values even when controlling for the observed maintenance costs that include 
the energy costs, and 3) the estimated premium for energy efficient housing units decreases as 
confounding factors, detailed neighbourhood characteristics and maintenance cost in particular, 
are included in the price equation. Furthermore, we argue that it is impossible to derive a clear a 
priori expectation on the link between energy efficiency levels and liquidity (as measured by time 
on market) from theory as the hypothesised relationships work in opposite directions, potentially 
cancelling each other out. 
Empirically, we find evidence in support of each of the three hypotheses. First, a statistically 
significant price premium only exists for the highest (ABC) energy ratings and no impact is found 
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for below average ratings. This implies that only a fraction of households are energy-aware and 
willing to pay a premium for more energy efficient housing. Secondly, the premium exists even 
when maintenance costs are included in the model as a control variable. If the energy ratings were 
only priced according to implied cost savings, we would expect the ratings to become insignificant 
in the hedonic estimation once maintenance costs are taken into account. A significant premium 
suggests that buyers consider additional factors in their implicit valuation of energy-efficient homes. 
This conjecture is in line with the findings of Gliedt and Hoicka (2015) and also supported by 
Popescu et al. (2012) who argue that factors other than the potential energy cost savings are at 
play when the economic value of energy efficiency improvements is measured. Third, while the 
valuation impact for high-rated units is significant in all model specifications, adding more careful 
neighborhood controls and maintenance costs substantially decreases the estimated premium. In 
contrast with the price effects, we do not detect any influence of energy ratings on the liquidity of 
housing. 
The next section describes a conceptual framework to consider the pricing effects of housing 
energy efficiency ratings. A brief presentation of the Helsinki market is provided and the dataset 
used in the empirical analysis is delineated in section three. That section also includes a detailed 
description of the energy rating system in Finland. After that, we present the estimation approach 
and report the empirical results. Summary and conclusion, including a discussion of policy 
implications, are provided in the final section. 
A conceptual model of energy efficiency and house prices 
Every house purchase decision also entails an implicit or explicit decision about the desired level of 
energy efficiency. Leaving aside the rich literature on the limitations to rational decision-making for 
the moment, it is straightforward to assume that the utility a household derives from owning a 
dwelling can be written in Cobb-Douglas form:  
            
 
   
          (1) 
where E(Un) is the total utility of a dwelling n which comprises energy efficiency (e) and all other 
characteristics of the dwelling (x). Each homebuyer then faces the decision of choosing the levels 
of energy efficiency and other characteristics with weights β and γ respectively that maximize their 
utility according to their individual preferences. The choice of a level of energy efficiency is thus 
part of a larger bundle of characteristics of a property such as size, location, state of repair etc. and 
potentially correlated with these factors. For example, properties with state-of-the-art energy 
efficiency levels may be found in more affluent locations and also be larger and better maintained 
than properties with lower energy ratings. Matisoff et al (2014) posit in the context of firm 
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production functions that higher e is not only associated with cost savings via lower energy 
consumption but also creates a competitive advantage via a 'green' signal to consumers from 
environmentally friendly investment. In a similar vein, Gliedt and Hoicka (2015), present empirical 
evidence of Cooreman's (2011) contention that investments in energy efficiency are not only 
motivated by financial but also by strategic considerations in the commercial real estate sector, for 
example in an effort to improve the brand image of a company. For the present study of the 
housing market, we seek to infer whether an analogous motivation exists for homebuyers, i.e. 
whether price differentials are motivated purely by utility bill savings or whether green consumers 
may also seek to increase their status by buying an energy-efficient home. 
The utility of energy efficiency can be assumed to rise with each increment in the energy rating 
albeit at an increasing marginal rate. The concept of increasing marginal utility in relation to social 
and economic status gains has been developed by Friedman (1953), Lommerud (1989) and 
corroborated by more recent work, for example by Ray and Robson (2010). While the cost savings 
associated with higher energy efficiency can be viewed as quasi-linear, the signalling value of 
energy ratings increases in non-linear fashion. In other words, all dwellings above the lowest grade 
show energy cost savings, but only the above-average rated dwellings will have additional 
signaling value attached to them that allows households to visually demonstrate their 
environmentally conscious values and behaviour to their peers. Thus, the utility derived from the 
energy efficiency level of a dwelling is a combination of the linear utility of the cost savings (cs) 
from energy efficiency and the convex utility of the signalling value (sv).  
            
     (2) 
The willingness to pay for a given step increase in energy efficiency equals then the total marginal 
utility increase from linear cost savings and the non-linear signaling value.  
It is important to note that demand for the higher tier of energy efficiency investments may not be 
distributed equally across all homebuyers. Some buyers may derive higher utility from living in 
greener dwellings than others because of their intrinsic environmental values and preferences 
and/or the collective environmental attitudes of their peer group to which they may signal housing 
consumption that is in line with these attitudes by buying 'greener' apartments. This may give rise 
to a ‘green signalling effect’ where only a fraction of households are willing to pay a premium for 
superior energy performance while most households do not place any value on energy ratings. 
Based on the above conceptual framework, three hypotheses can be developed and tested 
empirically: 1) the signalling effect, arising from signaling values to the peers, increases demand 
for the high-rated dwellings inducing a price premium for them, whereas the below average classes 
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do not sell at a discount compared with the average energy efficiency dwellings, 2) the higher-tier 
energy ratings affect the housing values and liquidity even when controlling for the observed 
maintenance cost that include the energy costs, and 3) the estimated premium for energy efficient 
housing units decreases as confounding factors, notably location, maintenance cost and dwelling 
condition are included in the price equation.  
There are some intervening factors that may lead to non utility maximising outcomes, particularly 
with regard to the potential cost saving part of the utility function. Gillingham et al (2006) identify a 
number of market failures that lead to suboptimal investment levels in energy efficiency. More 
recently, Szumilo and Fuerst (2014) report a 'green operating expense puzzle', i.e. the total 
operating expenses of eco-certified commercial properties are higher, not lower, than those of 
comparable non-certified properties. The complexity of the interaction between the intrinsic energy 
efficiency of a property and behavioural factors governing actual energy demand may act to further 
confound the simple relationship between energy efficiency levels and observed pricing 
mechanisms. Finally, an absence of a price premium on energy savings may also indicate high 
discount rates of these future savings due to uncertainty and other factors such as a generally low 
rate of 'energy literacy' among homebuyers reported by Brounen et al. (2012). Studies of individual 
differences in discount rates also show that cognitive ability plays an important role. For example, 
Warner and Pleeter (2001) find that individuals with higher mental test scores have lower implicit 
discount rates, possibly because of a larger capacity to understand intertemporal choices and long-
term investment decisions. These differences at the individual level may then lead to observable 
differences in the pricing of energy efficiency among different groups of buyers despite the 
seemingly identical and linear cost savings associated with energy efficiency levels.  
 
Helsinki Dataset and the Finnish energy efficiency rating system 
This study is based on transaction level housing sales data for the Helsinki metropolitan area 
(HMA) from 2009 to 2012. The HMA contains Helsinki, the capital of Finland, and the two 
municipalities surrounding it (Espoo and Vantaa), and is by far the largest metro area in Finland 
with its 1.1 million inhabitants. These HMA data are used to investigate the influence of energy 
ratings on housing sales prices and time on market. 
Our data consist of second-hand transactions of privately financed apartments. That is, the data 
exclude newly built dwellings. There are good reasons to focus on the privately financed (i.e. non-
subsidised) sector only: In Finland, privately financed housing can be bought and sold at market 
prices without any restrictions, whereas selling prices and rental prices are controlled in the 
publicly regulated (i.e. subsidised) sector. Furthermore, the data consist only of apartments, since 
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data on apartments are more reliable than data on the other housing types in the HMA. Apartments 
are the dominant housing type in the area (75% of dwellings are apartments) and a substantially 
more homogenous group in their characteristics than the other housing types. Moreover, a notably 
greater number of transactions take place in the apartment market than in the market for other 
housing types. Therefore, the use of apartment data diminishes the heterogeneity complication that 
may be associated with housing price analysis even when hedonic modelling techniques are 
applied. A similar rationale applies to energy consumption which would be problematic to compare 
across different house types and regions due to the interaction with multiple confounding factors 
(Heinonen and Junnila, 2014). In 2012, the total number of permanently occupied apartment units 
in the HMA was 417 900, while the whole housing stock included 554 000 occupied dwellings. 
From a construction company’s / developer’s point of view, it would be particularly interesting to 
know the value of energy efficiency regarding new housing construction. The study excludes new 
builds, though. Nevertheless, even the data on secondary market transactions is expected to 
reveal important information concerning the value of newly built housing, since new dwellings and 
older stock can generally be considered as close substitutes for each other – the same hedonic 
pricing principles and values must largely apply to newly built housing as to the existing housing 
stock. 
The housing transaction data are provided by the private real estate agency Kiinteistömaailma. 
The data include all the apartment transactions made using this agency's services, i.e., 
approximately 25% of all the transactions in the area during the sample period. The data contain 
detailed information on the characteristics of each transacted unit, such as age, size, address etc. 
Our sample consists of 6203 observations with an energy efficiency rating, of which 9 were 
excluded from the analysis as obvious price anomalies with more than three standard deviations 
from the mean price per square metre. The selection of key characteristics that we include in the 
analysis is presented in Table 1.  
Compared to data provided by the Finnish Real Estate Federation, the distribution of energy 
ratings in our sample is largely in line with the energy rating distribution in the whole stock of 
apartments in Helsinki. We report the characteristics separately for four different energy efficiency 
groups, since we use this grouping in the econometric estimations. As the number of A (23) and B 
(102) rated observations is very small, we combine the three high-tier bands so that the top-tier 
energy efficiency group (ABC) comprises 631 observations. In line with the overall Helsinki 
apartment stock, the share of the ABC group is some 10% of our sample. We consider this the 
target group of dwellings for green consumers in our signalling effect hypothesis. This also reflects 
the fact that it is hard to achieve higher than the average energy efficiency rating in the Finnish 
market. We also combine the two lowest ratings, i.e. F and G, because separately especially G 
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would have too small a number of observations (101) for a reliable analysis. As shown in Table 1, 
most of the units are either D or E rated. The most common rating is D with 44% of the overall 
sample being rated in this medium category. 
[Table 1 around here] 
The average transaction prices are in line with market observations as reported by Statistics 
Finland. The characteristics considered here include the standard hedonic characteristics such as 
age, size and location as well as a number of more specialised features. For example, a sauna is 
considered to add value to a housing unit in the Finnish context due to its importance in Finnish 
cultural tradition. A notable share of apartments includes a sauna. Note also that the data allow us 
to include detailed variables on the floor and building height, and importantly on both the road 
distance to CBD and the travel time to the CBD using public transportation obtained from 
MetropAccess (2014) Travel Time Matrix.  
Our neighborhood measures are obtained from Statistics Finland’s grid database 2010. This 
database is based on 250 x 250 meter grids and includes a number of relevant variables for 
housing values, in addition to grid coordinates. These variables contain information about the 
socioeconomic structure and the housing stock of the neighborhoods. In Helsinki, as in many other 
cities around the world, neighborhoods can be quite small in area, and there can be ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ neighborhoods in close proximity. Thus, it is important to be able to include detailed 
neighborhood information in the hedonic analysis as pointed out in several seminal papers (e.g. 
Rosen, 1974; Bartik, 1987; Malpezzi, 2003). The lower part of Table 1 contains key descriptive 
statistics for the neighborhood measures used in the analysis. 
With respect to most characteristics, the differences across the three energy efficiency classes are 
only small. The average per sqm selling price of the high-rated (ABC) units is somewhat greater 
than that of the D and E rated units. However, the average transaction price is the highest for the 
low energy efficiency class (FG). The high-rated apartments are a bit larger than the other ones, on 
average. Generally, the ABC rated units are located slightly further away from the CBD, which is in 
line with the fact that they typically are newer. The most notable differences across the groups 
concern the dwelling condition and sauna variables: the mean values indicate that the high-rated 
units are in substantially better shape and are much more likely to include a sauna than the lower-
rated ones. 
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of observations for each of our four energy classes. In 
this figure, grey coloured areas are water. While the big picture regarding the locational distribution 
is similar for each class, there are some differences across the classes. Most notably, the number 
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of FG observations is very small in the western part of HMA. In any matter, we control for the 
locational factors in great detail in the econometric analysis. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
Energy efficiency rating and maintenance costs 
Since 2009, all flats that are on sale in Finland are required to obtain an energy efficiency 
certificate. However, during our sample period the certificate was voluntary for apartments in small 
housing companies, i.e., in companies with no more than six dwellings, that were built before 2008. 
The certificate reports the actual heating energy, cooling energy and (other) electricity usage of the 
building. The energy efficiency value is based on the actual observed energy consumption, and the 
energy usage values are stated as kWh per gross floor area (m2) per year. This differs from the 
typical European case, where the energy efficiency rating is appraisal-based. The energy rating is 
valid for 10 years. Given the typical level of maintenance in the housing companies, the energy 
efficiency of a given building is unlikely to change within the 10 year period. During the sample 
period, the ratings were based on the following energy consumption bands: 







Due to the cold winter in Helsinki with subzero long-term average lowest daily temperatures from 
November until March, buildings generally require good heat insulation regarding walls, floor, 
ceiling, loft, and windows to receive a high energy efficiency rating. A typical building that meets 
the requirements of building regulations set in 2008 is generally D rated. Ottelin et al. (2015) show 
that the emissions from housing energy are generally much lower in new buildings compared with 
the old stock in Finland, as expected. 
Because the average outside temperature – and thereby the heating energy usage – can vary 
across years, the heating energy consumption is ‘normalised’. The normalisation takes into 
account the difference between the average temperature of the year during which the energy 
consumption is observed and the long-term average annual temperature. 
12 
 
The rating is the same for all the apartments within the same building, as the rating is given at the 
housing company level. Practically all apartments in Finland are part of a housing company. A 
potential complication with the rating system is that the observed energy consumption is 
dependent on the habits of people living in the building, not only on the building characteristics. 
Another complication is caused by the varying number of people per sqm living in different 
buildings, as the energy consumption is normalised only with respect to the floor area. Fortunately, 
the energy consumption that influences the energy rating is not largely dependent on the number 
of people staying in the building. This is because 1) the heating and cooling energy are typically 
only slightly affected by the number of dwellers and 2) electricity consumption used in the rating 
computations does not incorporate the electricity usage inside apartments – it only includes 
general building level electricity usage (heating, outside lighting, stairway lighting, and various 
building level machinery such as lifts, pumps etc.). The within-unit electricity consumption, i.e. 
lighting and various appliances such as TV and washing machines, is billed to each household 
separately: As this consumption is largely dependent on a  household’s size and habits, it does not 
enter the energy efficiency calculations apart from inside-unit water heating. The fact that within-
unit energy consumption on the overall heating energy usage is generally only small – in 2011 the 
share was 17% in Finland according to Statistics Finland – diminishes the potential influence of this 
complication on the results. According to the  Finnish Ministry of the Environment, there are no 
further significant complications pertaining to the energy efficiency ratings of apartments (although 
terraced and detached houses face such complications but this is outside the scope of this paper 
which focusses on apartments).  
In Finland, each dwelling in a housing company is charged an identical monthly per square metre 
maintenance fee. While information on the maintenance costs are not available for most countries, 
in the Finnish context the company form of housing ownership allows for the recording of 
maintenance costs for practically all the apartment transactions. In the housing company form of 
housing ownership – which quite closely corresponds to the housing cooperative structure in some 
other countries – ownership of a certain set of shares of the company confers the right to use a 
certain part of the building owned by the company, and a transaction of shares refers to a sale of 
shares entitling right to use a given dwelling owned by the company. The owners pay a monthly 
fee towards maintenance costs. The maintenance cost fee is public information. One advantage of 
the housing company structure is risk pooling among the individual households owning units 
through shares. Another attractive feature is the economies of scale (with respect to maintenance) 
provided by a company owning a number of dwellings. 
The maintenance costs charged by housing companies include the aforementioned company level 
energy consumption costs as well as several other expenditures including administration, cleaning 
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services, refuse disposal, insurances, and real estate tax. Similar to the energy rating calculations, 
the company level maintenance costs do not incorporate the within-unit electricity consumption, for 
which households are billed individually. According to Statistics Finland, the average share of 
heating energy expenditure of the overall maintenance costs of Helsinki area apartment stock was 
20% in 2010-2011. Corresponding values for electricity and gas was 3%, and 7% for water 
(including sewage). The relatively small share of gas and electricity can be explained by the fact 
that a great majority of the buildings are heated through central/district heating. According to 
Statistics Finland, 86% of heating energy of the whole Finnish stock of apartments was supplied 
via district heating in 2011. While our maintenance cost variable incorporates costs stemming from 
the building level energy usage, separate data on the actual energy consumption or costs are not 
available. It is also worth noting that the results of our analysis are mainly reflective of the situation 
in the bulk of the housing stock that uses district heating. The results could potentially be different 
for stock with other configurations and billing arrangements.    
However, as the main research question is whether the ratings contain independent pricing 
information in excess of the maintenance costs including prevailing energy usage costs, and 
information affecting the liquidity of apartments, the caveats mentioned above should not cause 
notable complications. In particular, a finding that the energy ratings have pricing information even 
in a model including maintenance costs would indicate that the ratings contain independent value 
and information. 
The summary statistics in Table 1 provide an indication of the link between the energy 
performance rating and average maintenance cost. The top section of Table 1 shows that average 
monthly maintenance costs per square metre are €3.08 for the ABC class, €3.33 and €3.64 for D 
and E rated units respectively, and €3.74 for the lowest energy efficiency class (FG). Since this 
difference in maintenance costs may be due to not strictly energy performance related factors, for 
example deteriorating building substance, higher replacement and redecoration requirements etc., 
we also provide a regression for the maintenance costs in Table 2. This regression that controls for 
other factors potentially affecting the maintenance costs, confirms that the costs are lower in the 
more energy efficient buildings. In other words, higher energy performance is associated with lower 
maintenance costs even when comparing buildings with a similar condition, that are of similar age, 
that have similar location, etc. The omitted energy class in the regression is D. 




Empirical strategy and results 
In line with other studies in this topic area, we estimate hedonic housing price functions (Rosen, 
1974), where the dependent variable is the natural log of the transaction price while the detailed 
housing characteristics are used as explanatory variables that determine the value of a dwelling. 
This allows us to estimate a separate value for each characteristic, i.e., a separate price function 
for housing. As our most extensive model, we estimate the following regression specification: 
                                           (3) 
where 
 ln pilt = natural log of transaction price (unit i, neighbourhood l, time t) 
ERi = energy class {high-rated (ABC), E-rated (E), low-rated (FG); omitted group = D} 
Mainti = maintenance costs per square meter 
Xil = vector of house and neighbourhood characteristics 
nil = postal code fixed effects 
qit= year quarter fixed effects 
εilt= error term. 
β is a four-dimensional vector of coefficients on the energy classes, γ is the coefficient on 
maintenance costs, and λ is a vector of coefficients on the house and neighbourhood 
characteristics. In all model specifications, β, γ and λ are estimated using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) technique controlling for the clustering of model residuals. The usual assumption 
that εilt is iid (independently and identically distributed), is probably violated in this case with 
multiple observations of flat sales over time in the same locations. In the presence of clustered 
errors, OLS estimates are unbiased but the standard errors can be wrong, thus leading to incorrect 
inference. A natural generalisation is to assume clustered standard errors such that observations 
within a postal code area are correlated in some unobserved way but that there are no correlated 
errors across postal code areas (Rogers, 1993). 
By including the maintenance costs and energy efficiency ratings in the group of right hand side 
explanatory variables, we can investigate the impact of these factors on housing prices, and 
examine whether the energy class has some additional independent impact on the transaction 
price of a dwelling. We also add quarterly time dummies in the model to account for the time-
variation in the housing price level, and postal code dummies to account for unobserved time-
invariant neighbourhood attributes that might be correlated with the energy label. We estimate 
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similar model for the observed selling time, too, to examine the relationship between energy rating 
and expected time on market. 
As explained in the data section, we use four energy rating groups in the estimations: The above 
average energy efficiency group (ABC), the average classes (D and E), and the low-rated 
apartments (FG). The aggregation of the highest and lowest energy efficiency groups is preferable 
as the small number of observations in the A, B and G groups could yield spurious and 
idiosyncratic coefficient estimates. It is reasonable to consider the ABC class as the highly-rated 
units for the sake of testing the signalling hypothesis. 
Table 3 shows a number of alternative model specifications for the natural log of transaction price. 
The omitted energy efficiency group in the estimations is D. That is, the coefficients on the energy 
classes show the premium or discount compared with the average efficiency class.  
[Table 3 around here] 
Specification (1) only includes the energy classifications and no other explanatory variables 
(except for the time dummies). The point estimates indicate that the average selling price for the 
high-rated units is 18% higher and those for the E and FG rated units are respectively 8% and 6% 
lower than the mean value of D rated apartments. For the ABC and E classes the price difference 
also is highly statistically significant. However, the more detailed model specifications show that 
these observed price differences between the energy rating groups can be explained, to a major 
extent, by the locational and building characteristics. 
The inclusion of the typical variables included in hedonic housing price models to capture the 
influence of location and physical attributes of an apartment diminishes the absolute values of the 
coefficient on high-rated units to 3.3% with a model fit of 86% (specification 2). When controlling 
more carefully for the locational attributes by adding postal code dummy variables and the 
neighbourhood characteristics in specification (3), this point estimate further drops to 1.5%, while 
the model fit substantially increases to 93%. That is, the inclusion of the detailed neighbourhood 
characteristics that are often absent in related investigations causes a significant decline in the 
estimated premium for the energy efficient apartments: although the premium remains statistically 
significant, it is less than half the size shown by specification (2). Moreover, the coefficients on E 
and FG classes are insignificant in specification (3). Clearly, this points to an omitted variable bias 
in a model where the road and time distance to the CBD are the only variables reflecting the unit 
location, and is in line with our third hypothesis. Importantly, the results also give support to our 
signalling hypothesis, according to which there is a price premium for the high-rated units, whereas 
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there is no price discount for the low-rated compared with the average energy performance 
apartments. 
In support of our second hypothesis regarding the independent informational content of the energy 
ratings, the inclusion of maintenance costs only slightly affects the estimated premium for the ABC 
class: the point estimate on the ABC group is 1.3% in model (4). Expectedly, the coefficient 
decreases as the maintenance costs are controlled for, but this decline is insignificant. Thus, our 
results provide evidence in support of all our three hypotheses. 
We provide further robustness checks in Table A1 in the Appendix in order to investigate whether 
the finding of a price effect only in the highest energy efficiency class could be due to some form of 
non-linearity in the hedonic housing valuation that is not accounted for in the models in Table 3. In 
specification (1) in Table A1, all the continuous house related characteristics are taken into the 
main model (Model 4 in Table 3) raised to the third power. The results are largely unchanged, 
although the point estimate of top rated apartments drops slightly to 1.1% with a p-value of 0.052. 
It should be noted that adding all housing related continuous explanatory variables  in non-linear 
transformations may introduce overspecification into the model which may in turn bias the 
estimates. Hence, Model 2  in Table A1 presents the regression results for a model in which all 
insignificant second and third powers are dropped from the specification using backward 
elimination with a threshold p-value of 0.05. In this model, the premium on ABC class is practically 
the same as that reported in Table 3 and the valuation effect remains insignificant for other energy 
classes. In sum, we conclude that ourresults appear robust to additional non-linearity in the house 
price valuation identifying equation. 
Although this study does not focus on the capitalisation of energy cost savings to housing values 
per se, a brief quantitative assessment of the obtained coefficients appears in order here. The 
0.2%-point difference in the coefficient on ABC class between models (3) and (4) is not likely to 
provide a clear picture of the capitalisation of energy cost savings into housing value, since the age 
and condition variables can considerably influence the level of energy costs and may therefore be 
highly correlated with these costs (that we do not observe separately from the maintenance cost 
data). In other words, age and condition are likely to include part of the energy cost capitalisation 
effects in specifications (2) and (3). Therefore, we re-estimate models (3) and (4) without the age 
and condition variables (Table A2 in the Appendix) and observe that the R-squared remains over 
90% in these specifications. This suggests that the possible omitted variable bias stemming from 
excluding age and condition is unlikely to be a great concern. The model and coefficients of 
interests are robust to these changes in specification as the difference in the point estimate of ABC 
in these models (0.3% points) does not notably differ from the baseline models.  
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Note also that, given the point estimate of -0.05 (-0.08 in the version excluding age and condition) 
on maintenance costs and the fact that on average some 30% of the maintenance costs are 
related to energy consumption, the results imply that a 50% drop in energy costs would have a 
‘pure’ price effect (i.e. effect unrelated to the valuation impact of the energy rating) of only 0.8% 
(1.2%). Overall, our analysis does not confirm expected energy cost savings capitalisation but the 
causal effects warrant more careful investigation in follow-up research. 
An inability to detect a sizable capitalisation effect from the current energy cost savings is not 
necessarily at odds with rational behaviour. The discounted present value of the energy savings is 
generally only a small proportion of the overall property value. To illustrate this, let us consider the 
average savings of a typical energy class C unit compared with a D rated apartment. The average 
annual energy usage is 130kwh/m2 and 160kwh/m2 in C and D, respectively. The average size of 
an apartment in our sample is 57m2. Annual savings, with an energy price of €0.068/kwh, is then 
€116 per annum (Statistics Finland, 2016) . Assuming a real interest rate of 2% and a risk premium 
of 3% (given the uncertainty of the size of savings due to uncertainty in future energy prices and 
consumption), the present value of energy cost savings over 25 years is about €1700. Hence the 
expected  average capitalised value of C compared to D would be €1700 or roughly 1% of the 
average price of apartments in our sample. The savings are more substantial at both tails of the 
energy rating scale. For A and G rated apartments, similar computations yield present values of 
€4700 and (minus) €9400, respectively, but the share of A or G rated apartments in groups ABC 
and FG is relatively small. Obviously, the present values are greater in absolute value if the real 
discount rate is smaller than 5% or if we assume that energy prices grow faster than the general 
price level. For instance, assuming an annual real energy price growth rate of 1%, the present 
values would be €5200 for A, €1900 for D, and (minus) € 10300 for G. In any case, it should be 
understood that our estimates of cost capitalisation effects in Tables 3 and A2 are only coarse 
approximations and that individual cost savings may differ widely depending on the assumptions 
used in the worked examples above. 
An obvious follow-on question is why energy consumption for heating and the savings associated 
with higher energy efficiency do not appear to be fully capitalised into Helsinki apartment prices 
which seems to contradict the findings of a number of studies from other markets and countries.An 
obvious explanation may be that investments in energy efficiency tend to be unviable, particularly 
in times when energy prices are low as has for example been reported by Copiello and Bonifaci 
(2015). Another, more local, explanation may be the fact that individual occupants have very little 
control over their heating expenses in apartment buildings as these have district heating and 
heating bills are split among residents according to apartment size. Hence, there is little incentive 
for an individual household to be concerned about energy consumption as any excess 
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consumption by a particular household is essentially turned from a private into a social cost. For 
example, Kyrö et al (2011) as well as Heinonen and Junnila (2014) document how this fixed-ratio 
splitting mechanism stimulates higher aggregate energy consumption in Finnish and Swedish 
apartment buildings. It would be interesting to investigate further whether purchasers pay the same 
attention to heating costs when buying an apartment as they would when buying a detached house 
or an apartment with separate metering and billing or whether the opposite is the case.  
Absent energy savings capitalisation, there are several possible explanations for the observed 
‘independent’ premium for high-rated units. First, eco-consumers typically aim to buy above 
average rated dwellings, thereby inducing higher demand for those units. Second, a small fraction 
of households may expect energy prices to grow fast so that the expected energy cost increase (or 
more precisely the increase in excess of current maintenance costs) capitalises, at least to some 
extent, to the dwelling price if these households choose to buy A/B/C-rated units. Third, a pricing 
difference also could emerge partially due to smaller risk with respect to future obsolescence in the 
higher-rated units as these units are more likely to comply with future regulatory requirements 
(Falkenbach et al., 2010). For example, it seems likely that future regulations will become even 
more stringent, following the European Commission’s Energy Performance of Buildings Directive  
2010/31 (EPBD) which contains the concept of Nearly-Zero Energy Buildings (NZEB). Kurnitski et 
al (2015) present scenarios of cost-optimal and nearly-zero energy calculations for residential 
buildings. As all new buildings are required to meet the NZEB standard by 2020 according to the 
EPBD, this may disproportionately accelerate the obsolescence of the non-energy-efficient part 
housing stock.   
A potential complication in virtually all hedonic house price models estimated in the literature is that 
there can be omitted variables which could bias the point estimates and standard errors to some 
extent. The fit of our more detailed models is approximately 93%, which indicates that no important 
drivers have been omitted from our specification. Moreover, in addition to the typical explanatory 
variables included in the previous studies the models include a number of locational characteristics 
that control for neighbourhood effects that would otherwise remain unobserved – another factor 
increasing the reliability of our results. Finally, the building and zoning regulation in Finland are 
very stringent compared to most other countries. This also suggests that the possible unobserved 
variation in house price drivers is likely to be relatively small.  
Liquidity model 
The direction of the impact of energy efficiency ratings on liquidity and time and market is not 
straightforward from a theoretical perspective. On the one hand, there may be a larger number of 
potential buyers for an otherwise similar dwelling that is high energy-rated: Our signalling 
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hypothesis and the results reported above suggest that there is a set of market participants that 
aim to buy only high-rated units and are willing to pay a premium for those apartments. Thus, the 
liquidity of the high-rated units could be better. On the other hand, many owners of high-efficiency 
units that are about to sell the dwelling – being themselves environmentally aware and oriented – 
may expect to get notable price premiums for their apartments. As most market actors do not pay 
attention to the energy ratings based on the comments of housing market professionals and on our 
price estimations, it may take a long time for the seller to match with an equally aware buyer, and 
the seller may eventually need to substantially drop the required green premium. These potential 
effects can offset each other, of course. Therefore, the possible liquidity effect is essentially an 
empirical question. 
Table 4 only reports our best model for liquidity, because the key result does not vary across 
model specifications. The dependent variable is the natural log of the time on market, and the set 
of explanatory variables contains all the variables included in the most detailed price equation 
(specification (4) in Table 3). In addition, we add as an explanatory variable the residual series 
from price equation (4), as the deviation of the selling price of a dwelling compared with its hedonic 
price can notably affect the selling time based on the search theoretic models of the housing 
markets (e.g. Krainer, 2001; Novy-Marx, 2009). 
[Table 4 around here] 
The estimation results do not provide evidence of a liquidity effect of energy ratings. While the 
point estimates show a slightly shorter time on market for the high-rated units and a somewhat 
longer selling time for the E-rated apartments compared with the average energy class D, the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. Interestingly, higher maintenance costs make an 
apartment somewhat harder to sell. Similar to the price model, the inclusion of maintenance costs 
has only a marginal influence on the parameter estimates in the time on market model. In contrast 
with the price models, the liquidity model explains only some 13% of the variation in the dependent 
variable. This implies that a major share of the variation in time on market cannot be explained, at 
least by the typical explanatory variables, but a bulk of the variation seems to be random across 
sold units rather than related to the main characteristics of the location or physical structure. 
Conclusions 
This study investigates whether energy efficiency ratings, which are mandatory in various forms 
throughout the European Union, are able to create additional incentives to invest in energy efficient 
housing. Using a sample of several thousand apartment transactions in the Helsinki market in 
Finland, we test if higher ratings were significantly associated with higher prices and shorter selling 
20 
 
times during 2009-2012, controlling for a large number of other property and neighbourhood 
characteristics. 
We find a statistically significant price premium for the high-rated (ABC) apartments even when 
controlling for the maintenance costs that incorporate the housing company level energy usage. 
While there is a clear price premium for the most energy efficient class of buildings, the market 
does not seem to differentiate between low- and medium-rated units. This may arise in a situation 
where the majority of households do not pay attention to or may not even be aware of the energy 
ratings whereas environmentally aware households may pay attention to the energy ratings and 
subsequently target properties with good or excellent ratings. In this situation, segmented demand 
will arise and price premia will only become observable for the top tier of energy ratings and no 
differentiation within the mainstream market. We call this the ‘green signalling effect’ in the housing 
market that is induced by a niche of consumers aiming to signal their green values, analogous to 
corporate social responsibility motives observed in the commercial real estate market (Gliedt and 
Hoicka, 2015). However, the energy ratings do not appear to have a notable influence on the 
expected time on market when the other relevant variables are controlled for. 
The empirical analysis provides some practical implications. The results suggest that the energy 
ratings have independent valuation effects that can provide incentives to buy and construct energy 
efficient housing. That is, our results imply that the energy ratings do matter, at least in the upper 
end of the distribution, even though we find that introducing additional control variables that were 
not used in most previous studies lead to a smaller green price premium. This could be an 
important message given that adoption rates of energy performance certificates seem to have 
been low and declining over time at least in some countries within the European Union (Brounen 
and Kok, 2011). 
More broadly, these empirical results provide important pricing information to real estate 
developers and investors. For the construction sector, a price premium for higher than average 
energy efficiency units could potentially provide a signal that is transmitted from the investment 
market to the space market, subsequently causing incentives for construction companies to 
construct green apartments and thereby leading to an increase in the supply of green buildings and 
less energy consumption. However, these price effects, based on our estimations, are not 
sufficient incentives for building highly energy efficient housing in the area. Thus, the policy 
recommendation – in order to increase energy efficient new construction – is to either tighten 
mandatory requirements or to contribute to an increase in the price premium for energy efficient 
housing. The latter could be achieved by improving the public awareness of energy costs and 
energy ratings (i.e. by improving economic literacy with respect to housing costs and valuation, and 
by strengthening the households’ green values) or by increasing the expected economic benefits of 
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energy efficiency (through taxation or subsidies, for instance). One possible tax policy would be to 
impose a higher property tax rate on the less energy efficient buildings. 
 
The findings of this paper are not necessarily generalisable to other markets located in different 
climate conditions. On the one hand, one might expect that higher energy efficiency will generally 
have a greater premium in the countries where the average energy efficiency standard of housing 
is notably lower and thereby the difference in the energy efficiency between the average building 
and the high-rated apartments is much greater – after all, Finland is a market that arguably 
maintains some of the highest building and energy efficiency standards in the world due to its 
harsh winters. A gradual tightening of minimum requirements for energy efficiency over the next 
few years would not necessarily take away the financial incentives to build (or refurbish) above 
average energy efficient units in countries with much less energy-efficient building stock. On the 
other hand, energy efficiency may be particularly relevant in a cold climate due to potentially large 
heating cost differences arising from the quality of insulation. In addition, as our analysis is based 
on an actual consumption-based rating system, the empirical findings are not necessarily 
generalisable to countries with appraisal-based or mixed rating regimes. 
Follow-up research may explore these issues in greater depth. A particularly attractive opportunity 
for further analysis arises from the fact that the energy efficiency rating system was switched from 
a consumption-based system as reflected in this study to one that estimates the hypothetical 
energy requirements based on the intrinsic energy efficiency quality of a dwelling's components. 
This would allow to discern different valuation effects of these two fundamentally different 
efficiency rating philosophies in future research. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
  Energy ABC Energy D Energy E Energy FG 
  N=631 N=2731 N=2379 N=453 
  mean std.dev mean std.dev mean std.dev mean std.dev 
                  
Apartment and building charateristics               
Price (€/m2) A 3 656 1 181 3 343 1 211 3 414 1 208 3 694 1 139 
Maintenance costs (€/m2) 3.08 0.75 3.33 0.76 3.64 0.78 3.74 0.91 
Size (m
2
) 63.9 24.1 59.1 21.6 53.7 20.7 50.8 21.1 
Age 30.1 29.0 42.0 24.6 50.2 19.8 54.2 17.8 
Condition                 
   -very good 0.20 0.40 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.21 
   -good 0.58 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 
   -satisfactory 0.20 0.40 0.35 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50 
   -bad 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 
Sauna (dummy) 0.52 0.50 0.25 0.43 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.29 
Floor 3.31 2.03 3.09 1.78 2.96 1.76 3.08 2.01 
Maximum floor 5.67 2.39 5.24 2.12 4.90 2.01 4.94 2.41 
Penthouse (dummy) 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.44 
Road distance to CBD (km) 12.3 6.30 11.6 6.46 10.0 5.93 8.56 5.36 
Travel time to CBD (minutes)
 B
 28.4 10.1 27.1 10.6 25.3 10.0 23.3 9.66 
                  
Neighborhood characteristics                 
Homeownership rate 0.53 0.19 0.52 0.18 0.52 0.16 0.52 0.15 
Mean income per capita (€/year) 27896 5637 25968 4632 24928 3942 25046 3822 
College degree 0.31 0.12 0.28 0.12 0.27 0.11 0.29 0.10 
Unemployment rate 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.03 
Pensioner share 0.18 0.08 0.21 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.11 
Share of families with children 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.07 
Service jobs/capita 0.19 0.38 0.30 0.81 0.32 0.93 0.38 0.95 
Number of buildings 19.1 10.4 18.1 10.1 18.5 11.0 19.2 11.4 
Mean dwelling size (m
2
) 63.7 11.2 59.5 10.9 56.2 11.3 54.2 11.8 
Population 687 421 735 510 735 530 721 521 
Notes: 
A
 Prices are deflated to year 2013 using consumer price index. 
B




Table 2: Regression estimates for maintenance costs  
Dependent variable: log of maintenance costs per sqm   
Energy class ABC -0.029** 
  [0.014] 
Energy class E 0.048*** 
  [0.012] 
Energy class FG 0.057*** 
  [0.026] 
    
R-squared 0.33 
    
N 6194 
    
Year quarter fixed effects yes 
    
Postal code fixed effects yes 












    
Notes: The omitted energy class is D. Estimated coefficient is statistically significant at *** 1% 
level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Standard errors are clustered within postal code area, number of 
clusters is 118. 
A
 House characteristics include: age raised to the second power, dummies for 
condition (bad, satisfactory, good, very good), dummy for sauna, dummies for floor (less than 4, 
4 to 6, 7 to 9, more than 9) dummies for maximum floor (less than 4, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, more than 9) 
and dummy for penthouse. 
B
 CBD distance is measured in road distance and in travel time using 
public transportation. 
C
 Neighborhood controls include: share of homeowners, log of mean 
income, share with college education, share of unemployed, share of pensioners, share of 





Table 3: Regression estimates for transaction prices 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Energy class ABC 0.1823*** 0.0332** 0.0150** 0.0130** 
  [0.0392] [0.0143] [0.0064] [0.0062] 
Energy class E -0.0816*** -0.0170* -0.0030 0.0000 
  [0.0239] [0.0096] [0.0055] [0.0057] 
Energy class FG -0.0587 0.0073 -0.0020 0.0002 
  [0.0380] [0.0177] [0.0083] [0.0052] 
          
Log(maint costs/m
2
) - - - -0.0529*** 
  - - - [0.0139] 
          
R-squared 0.074 0.857 0.932 0.933 
Adj. R-squared 0.071 0.856 0.930 0.931 
          
N 6194 6194 6194 6194 
          
Year quarter fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
          
Postal code fixed effects     yes yes 
          
House characteristics
A
   yes yes yes 
   
      
CBD distance 
B
   yes yes yes 
          
Neigh. Characteristics 
C
     yes yes 
          
Maintenance costs       yes 
          
Notes: The omitted energy class is D. Estimated coefficient is statistically significant at *** 
1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Standard errors are clustered within postal code area, 
number of clusters is 118. 
A
 House characteristics include: area raised to the third power, 
age raised to the second power, dummies for condition (bad, satisfactory, good, very good), 
dummy for sauna, dummies for floor (less than 4, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, more than 9), dummies for 
maximum floor (less than 4, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, more than 9), and dummy for penthouse. 
B
 CBD 
distance is measured in road distance and in travel time using public transportation. 
C
 
Neighborhood controls include: share of homeowners, log of mean income, share with 
college education, share of unemployed, share of pensioners, share of families with 




Table 4: Regression estimates for time on market 
 Dependent variable: log of time on market   
Energy class ABC -0.0131 
  [0.0499] 
Energy class E 0.0438 
  [0.0281] 
Energy class FG 0.0003 
  [0.0528] 




  [0.0545] 
    
R-squared 0.013 
    
N 6194 
    
Year quarter fixed effects yes 
    
Postal code fixed effects yes 












    
Maintenance costs yes 
    
Notes: The omitted energy class is D. Dependent variable: log of saletime in days+1 (some 
observation that were sold the first day they were on the market). Estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant at *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Standard errors are clustered 
within postal code area, number of clusters is 118. 
A
 House characteristics include: residual of the 
most extensive price estimation, log of maintenance costs, area raised to the third power, age raised 
to the third power, condition, dummy for sauna, dummies for floor (less than 4, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, more 
than 9) dummies for maximum floor (less than 4, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, more than 9), and dummy for 
penthouse. 
B
 CBD distance is measured in road distance and in travel time using public 
transportation. 
C
 Neighborhood controls include: share of homeowners, log of mean income, share 
with college education, share of unemployed, share of pensioners, share of families with children, 










Table A1: Robustness check form of the hedonic model 
Dependent variable: log of sales price 
  (1) (2) 
Energy class ABC 0.0110* 0.0134** 
  [0.0056] [0.0058] 
Energy class E 0.0005 0.0008 
  [0.0056] [0.0057] 
Energy class FG 0.0081 0.0093 
  [0.0084] [0.0081] 
      
R-squared 0.935 0.934 
Adj. R-squared 0.933 0.933 
      
N 6194 6194 
      
Year quarter fixed effects yes yes 
      
Postal code fixed effects yes yes 
      
House characteristics yes yes 
(area raised to the third power, age 
raised to the third power)    
CBD distance  yes yes 
(road distance raised to the second 
power)   
Neigh. Characteristics  yes yes 
  
Maintenance costs yes 
yes 
(only the third power) 
      
Notes: (1) Results of a regression where all continuous house related controls are taken into the main model 
raised to the third power (road distance to CBD, travel time to CBD, area, age, and maintenance costs). (2) 
Results of a regression where backward elimination (with a threshold p-value of 0.05) is performed for 
continuous house and neighborhood characteristics used in column (1). The omitted energy class is D. 
Estimated coefficient is statistically significant at *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Standard errors are 




Table A2: Regression estimates for transaction prices when age and condition are excluded 
Dependent variable: log of sales price 
  (1) (2) 
Energy class ABC 0.0374*** 0.0345*** 
  [0.0010] [0.0096] 
Energy class E -0.0119 -0.0081 
  [0.0055] [0.0058] 
Energy class FG -0.0143 -0.0098 
  [0.0102] [0.0099] 
      
Log(maint costs/m
2
) - -0.0794*** 
  - [0.0177] 
      
R-squared 0.907 0.909 
Adj. R-squared 0.905 0.906 
      
N 6194 6194 
      
Year quarter fixed effects yes yes 
      
Postal code fixed effects yes yes 
      
House characteristics
A
 yes yes 
      
CBD distance 
B
 yes yes 
      
Neigh. Characteristics 
C
 yes yes 
      
Maintenance costs yes yes 
      
Notes: The omitted energy class is D. Estimated coefficient is statistically significant at *** 1% level, 
** 5% level, * 10% level.  Standard errors are clustered within postal code area, number of clusters is 
118. 
A
 House characteristics include: area raised to the third power, dummy for sauna, dummies for 
floor (less than 4, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, more than 9), dummies for maximum floor (less than 4, 4 to 6, 7 to 9, 
more than 9), and dummy for penthouse. 
B
 CBD distance is measured in road distance and in travel 
time using public transportation. 
C
 Neighborhood controls include: share of homeowners, log of mean 
income, share with college education, share of unemployed, share of pensioners, share of families 
with children, number of buildings, log of mean house area, and population. 
 
